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 China’s current importance on the world political and economic stage is hardly an 
anomaly in the history of the world. Five thousand years of dynastic history, science, literature, 
engineering, and military might speak to China’s national pride, their record of 
accomplishments, and their promise for projecting strength and leadership. In the twenty-first 
century, China has rediscovered its historical strength, breaking off colonial chains, and 
extending its influence abroad in ways not seen since the voyages of Zheng He during the Ming 
Dynasty. In East Asia, China is the clear regional hegemon. Two schools of international 
political thought — realism and liberalism — assess its implications and what it means for 
economic and military power balances differently. The United States, therefore, is at a crossroads 
in this strategic part of the world and has a difficult decision to make. It must either accept realist 
thinking and approach China skeptically as a constant potential adversary, or it must adopt a 
liberal approach and take China to be a major economic partner with potential for 
democratization. Although China does not necessarily present an explicit military challenge to 
the United States, it has and will continue to contest America’s economic and political influence, 
to the detriment of America’s interests and presence in East Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to 
assume a realist worldview by observing with caution and skepticism when dealing with China. 
The United States must preempt their geopolitical moves accordingly to ensure they do not assert 
undue action against their neighbors in a way that would violate international norms or the 
sovereignty of our regional allies. 
 To start, it is essential that any conversation on the rise of China and its implications for 
American foreign policy begin with the differences between the realist and the liberal schools of 
international thought, as well as how they respectively interpret political developments and their 
causal mechanisms. The realist worldview adheres to the notion that power is king. Realists 
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believe that international politics happens within the scope of an anarchic world order and 
therefore operates according to a self-help system, meaning that power-balancing is a common 
feature among states.1 Since each state is the best and only guardian of its own core interests, it 
must approach other partners with the understanding that it cannot truly depend on them for 
security or other mutual benefits. Self-interest governs most state interactions, and to ensure their 
own maximum outcomes, states need to gain a relative military and economic power advantage 
over their neighbors. According to Christopher Layne, there is a version of realism known as 
offensive realism, which dictates that states gain security by eliminating their rivals, and, to an 
extent, by becoming a hegemon in their own right.2 This power-focused dynamic has indeed 
played out on more than one occasion throughout history, mainly through war. Both World Wars 
are perfect examples of this. Entangling alliance networks developed in both cases in an attempt 
to geo-strategically outmaneuver the opposing state-alliance network, whether it be the Triple 
Alliance and Entente of the first World War, or the Axis and Allies of the second World War. 
Indeed, as it affects America, Christopher Layne makes indirect reference to the Monroe 
Doctrine as America’s attempt to establish its own hemispherical hegemony, meaning that it 
would take any European military entrance into its “backyard” as a challenge against its own 
territorial legitimacy. He responds to John Mearsheimer’s hypothetical scenario of a Post-War 
victorious Germany making an alliance with Mexico by criticizing the notion that it would ever 
happen, since America, acting in accordance with a realist perspective, would launch a 
preventive war.3  
                                                     
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, 25.1 (2000): 5. 
2 Christopher Layne, “The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon,” Security Studies 
12.2 (2002): 127. 
3 Ibid. 
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  In the contemporary context, realism dictates circumstances with China and its 
geopolitical situation. Walter Russell Mead makes reference to what he calls the “Axis of 
Weevils”: China, Russia, and Iran.4 Although at the U.N. these countries appear to form a 
cohesive anti-American unit, that is exactly as far as their cohesion goes. As guided by realism’s 
explanation of self-interest, China does not see eye to eye with Russia and Iran on relations 
between them. China wants low oil prices as a net importer, while Iran and Russia want to sell 
high. China also prefers political stability in the Middle East while Russia and Iran want to use it 
to their advantage.5 As will be discussed later on, China’s attempt to disrupt the status quo in 
East Asia is tightening links between the U.S. and its Asian allies. It is also increasing 
nationalism in Japan,6 both of which are realist survival mechanisms and instincts. 
 In stark contrast, the liberal school of international relations theory offers a less cynical, 
more optimistic view of interactions among states. In the liberal internationalist view, there are 
two key beliefs. The first is Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which suggests that democratic 
states do not go to war against one another, which is a key reason for the promotion of 
democracy around the world as a means of improving America’s security situation.7 The second 
belief is that trade facilitates positive relationships and interdependence between the economies 
of the involved states, making it less likely that they will go to war. In some cases, the trade 
aspect can be absorbed into general political/economic partnerships that proceed from 
democratic cooperation. Therefore, it would be considered as a subset of the first belief on DPT. 
Indeed, John Ikenberry posits as much when he champions the notion of the Liberal order’s 
                                                     
4 Walter M. Mead, “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs 91.4 
(2014): n.p. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Can’t: The Myth of Democratic Peace,” International Security, 19.2 (1994): 5. 
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enduring power. He references the United States’ “sustained efforts to build a far-flung system of 
multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships” and how these 
bonding partnerships have “strengthen[ed] global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of 
nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence.”8 At the helm of global dominance, the United 
States has constructed an international order by way of either establishing or promoting such 
international organizations as NATO, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization. 
that have integrated new democracies, new states, and rising powers into a peaceful framework 
that has seen fewer conflicts since its implementation. Through the liberal democratic lens, 
interdependence creates a security apparatus in its own right not through force but through 
incentives. In this circumstance, China is most welcome and encouraged to participate as a way 
of giving them proverbial “skin” at stake in the international realm of democratic and trade 
prosperity, even if China itself is just only starting to experiment with open/non-partisan 
elections at the municipal level. Regardless, China is arguably constructing a mirroring 
international order with its membership in BRICS, its belt-and-road initiative, leadership of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and investment in Africa as a means to build its 
own illiberal order. As for military affairs, China’s aggressiveness against its neighbors over 
maritime rights and nearby islands does not make it a serious contender against the surrounding 
democratic security apparatus led by the U.S., so Ikenberry considers them simple “spoilers” at 
best to the notion of the prevailing liberal order9.  
 With both realist and liberal schools of thought accounted for, China’s foreign policy 
record and current trajectory reveals two competing narratives. Two Chinas exist between 
                                                     
8 Gilford John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs 
91.4 (2014): n.p. 
9 Ibid. 
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realists and liberals: one that is and has always been in peaceful coexistence with its neighbors 
(the liberal version), and another that is and always has been an aspiring great power, patiently 
awaiting its moment to claim the central seat of world influence (the realist version). The prior 
China wishes to preserve its own sovereignty and to respect that of its neighbors as it has always 
claimed to do. The latter China wishes to bring true life and physical meaning to its historical 
and metaphysical notion of itself as “Middle Kingdom”.  
 Starting with the realist assessment of Chinese foreign policy, one can observe that China 
has always acted the part of a power player seeking to assert regional hegemony at the cost of its 
neighbors, with times of internal turmoil and economic weakness only serving to delay its typical 
posture. This is determined from its stance on boundaries and self-perceived notion of centrality 
in the universe. As Henry Kissinger describes in his book On China, China has for millennia 
labeled itself “zhongguo – the ‘Middle Kingdom’ or the ‘Central Country’,” with its emperor 
“conceived of and recognized by most neighboring states as the pinnacle of a universal political 
hierarchy, with all other states’ rulers theoretically serving as vassals.”10 This reflects cultural 
pride in China’s own history, language, culture, and other nationally defining societal 
characteristics, but it has also driven a vain sense of self-importance that has caused it to look 
down upon other states. The more a certain people attained Chinese culture and rituals, which 
connotes submission to China, the more humanely and compassionately China would treat 
them.11 Barbarians, defined by the Chinese as people not in any way sharing a semblance to Sino 
customs and tradition, would be treated with hostility. In channeling raw security instincts as 
realism would predict, China dealt with its power imbalances against arriving European powers 
                                                     
10 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012): 2-3. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
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by creatively playing them against each other, or as the Chinese put it: to “use barbarians against 
barbarians.”12 Prior to the eighteenth century, this involved bribing “barbarians” to fight each 
other or submitting to their invaders and Sinicizing them after the fact. By the nineteenth 
century, although much less successful, it involved offering lucrative trade offers to the Russians, 
French, British, and other European powers, leaving them to compete among themselves for the 
preferred relationship. China inevitably had to settle for humiliating terms and treaties legally 
signing away concessions in the form of unfavorable trade deals and territory, and China never 
adhered to or honored western legalistic norms. Even as power politics and warfare have 
impacted the size of China’s realm of influence and its formal boundaries, China still adhered to 
its preferred interpretation of boundaries that served its own self-interest above that of its lesser 
neighbors.  Mao Zedong, leading a revolutionary Communist Party that was eliminating all 
notions of its feudal past, still conveniently invoked ancient imperial Chinese principles and 
traditions when doing so suited his political purposes. Such was the case when India and China 
faced a border dispute over the Himalayan frontier, with India claiming the legalistic McMahon 
Line demarcated by the British during their rule, and the Chinese claiming the limits of imperial 
China of dynasties past.13 It finished the war victoriously over India, and enforced a peace with 
them that they claim was similar to the peace enforced by the Tang Dynasty 1,300 years prior.  
 History aside, present-day China still exhibits realist tendencies in its economic and 
military posturing, indicating cause for concern over the stability of East Asia. Since the fall of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Chinese military strategy has shifted from continental defense to a 
focus on protecting air and maritime approaches to itself from the east in order to increase the 
                                                     
12 Ibid., 21. 
13 Ibid., 1. 
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costs of American intervention should a local war break out in China’s oceanic or terrestrial 
neighborhood.14 China’s counter strategy involves holding U.S. assets at risk within the first 
island chain in the East and South China seas, holding the U.S. surface navy at risk within the 
second island chain extending to the Marianas, and challenging the U.S. for space and 
cyberspace superiority.15 To achieve these ambitions, China has modernized and amplified the 
size of its strategic missile, air, and naval forces to catch up with the U.S. military presence, 
something a non-aspiring regional power would likely not attempt. China adopted a posture of 
threatening American forward bases. The PLA 2nd Artillery Corps added more than 1,100 short-
range ballistic missiles to its arsenal, with ranges stretching between Taiwan and Okinawa, in 
addition to 500 Land Attack Cruise missiles with a range to reach beyond Japan (~1000 nautical 
miles).16 According to Evan Montgomery, this new equipment and the fourth-generation air 
force are part of a “joint anti-air raid campaign” that is designed to send a salvo of missiles 
backed by air strikes against U.S. airbases for reassurance that the U.S. air force would be 
disabled.17 Meanwhile, the PLA Navy is acquiring thousands of Area Surface Cruise and 
Ballistic Missiles to threaten American aircraft carriers and obtaining enhanced-range 
submarines and radar detection equipment. Not only that, but China is also developing counter-
C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance) mechanisms, namely antisatellite missiles, radio frequency jammers, and 
                                                     
14 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of the U.S. 
Power Projection,” International Security 38.4 (2014): 130-131. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 132. 
17 Ibid., 133. 
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viruses, that have the ability to disable all electronic equipment, hardware, aircraft, and vessels 
belonging to the U.S. and its allies.18  
 Economically, China may seem amenable and open to scheming with fellow autocracies 
like Russia, since both seemingly form a duo in countering U.S. interests. Yet China has again 
attempted to outmaneuver so-called allies in an attempt to preserve dominance over its 
neighbors. One of the primary concerns is Central Asia. Once a part of the Soviet Union and 
Russian Empires, Central Asian states have found themselves to be very appealing partners 
caught in a tug-of-war for economic influence between Russia and China as China has 
aggressively inserted itself into Russia’s former territory. China has already entered a strategic 
partnership with Uzbekistan as of 2012, and Vladimir Putin has sought to counter China’s 
economic surge with the creation of the “Eurasian Union,” which is a military, political, and 
economic union akin to the European Union complete with an Economic Commission and a 
Customs Union.19 This has pulled Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan closer to Russia, but China still 
cuts into those relationships too. As of 2009, China had built pipelines connecting directly to 
Kazakh oil fields and Turkmen gas fields, bypassing Russia completely, thereby undercutting 
Russian energy profit potential in the region.20 China is evidently not one to accept resource 
dependency from other states. As China has done with its military, it is posturing itself 
economically to overcome its Russian neighbor. 
 The liberal interpretation of Chinese foreign policy would counter with a stark contrast to 
the aforementioned Machiavellian scheming suggested by realist judgments of China’s actions. 
The liberal understanding that market reforms enable liberal democratization and subsequently 
                                                     
18 Ibid., 134. 
19 Robert G. Sutter, The United States and Asia: Regional Dynamics and Twenty-First-Century Relations (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2015): 280-281. 
20 Thomas Graham, “The Sources of Russia’s Insecurity,” Survival 52.1 (2010): 65.  
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reduce conflict among states, can apply to China, even if it is a single party state, by participating 
in the international arena as a partner rather than an antagonist. Historically, China has been a 
singular kingdom in both its demographic identity and hegemony. Geography separated China 
from other major civilizations: The Himalayas separated it from India, the Central Asian deserts 
separated it from Persia, and the vast expanses of Siberia to the north and oceanic expanses to the 
south and east precluded any European contact until the seventeenth century. China has never 
been and still is not democratic, but nonetheless it still exercises indirect contact with distant 
lands along the Silk Road via trade caravans.21 It also never expressed a desire to claim or 
conquer new territories, an attitude completely opposite to European counterparts and their 
imperial ambitions. In fact, as Henry Kissinger notes:  
“The territorial claims of the Chinese Empire stopped at the water’s edge. As early as the 
Song Dynasty (960-1279), China led the world in nautical technology; its fleets could 
have carried the empire into an era of conquest and exploration. Yet China acquired no 
overseas colonies and showed relatively little interest in the countries beyond its coast. It 
developed no rationale for venturing abroad to convert the barbarians to Confucian 
principles or Buddhist virtues.”22 
 
Even in its imperial history, China never had aggressive territorial aims in lands it did not 
consider to be part of its core, defying realist expectations in classical and medieval eras and 
matching more closely the behavior of modern democratic states. The fact of this imperial outlier 
gives liberals reason to believe that China and its historical heritage do not fit the western 
psychological mold of international relations that would suggest it to be a Machiavellian member 
of the international community. In fact, with the exception of the communist ideological fervor 
pushed by Mao Zedong during his tenure as chairman, China has displayed a calm posture in 
foreign affairs.  
                                                     
21 Kissinger, On China, 8. 
22 Ibid. 
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 Whereas western states acting in the realist perspective might consider a build-up of arms 
and military modernization as an attempt at regional hegemony, China would consider it as a 
precautionary measure to ensure its own sovereignty against another invasive violation. Mao 
Zedong broke with Chinese history by engaging in what Thomas Christensen calls 
“revolutionary evangelism” in the 1950s and 1960s, fomenting armed revolts in neighboring 
states to spread revolutionary communism, notably in Korea, while shaming the Soviet Union for 
being too “moderate” in in its communist commitments.23 It could be interpreted as a 
reinforcement of neighboring regimes that had already chosen a communist path and were 
struggling to preserve it. Even so, at its worst, China under Mao opened to the United States 
through dialogue. In their first Joint Communique in 1972, China expressed its opposition to 
hegemony, its opposition to colonial imperialism, and support for national self-determination 
across the world.24 In fact, listed under the segment on mutual interests is a commitment by both 
the U.S. and China to avoid dividing the world into spheres of influence and to refrain from 
establishing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.25 Deng Xiaoping, speaking on behalf of Mao Zedong 
at the United Nations in 1974, repeated these sentiments in his speech at the 6th Special Session 
of the General Assembly when he said that should China ever become a superpower, it inevitably 
would also be a tyrant, seeing one and both as the same.26 The speech ironically carried an 
incendiary tone, condemning the exploitative nature of market capitalism as well as capitalism’s 
imperialistic aspects so as to champion the cause of the third world.  
                                                     
23 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015): 21-22. 
24 Joint Communique of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (Shanghai Communique), 
February 28, 1972. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” April 10, 1974. 
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 Yet, with Mao’s death, a new China would emerge. Deng Xiaoping, the Communist 
Party successor to Mao, pulled China from its aggressive revolutionary path and instead placed it 
on its current steady path of diplomatic integration. Almost immediately, Deng directed Chinese 
foreign policy on a path to openness, dialogue, and cooperation with the international 
community. The first major step was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 
December of 1978 (to take effect January 1, 1979), made possible by the reaffirmation of the 
Shanghai Communique against establishing hegemony and U.S. recognition of one China.27 
Despite the Chinese insistence on Taiwan’s importance to Chinese sovereignty, Deng allowed 
for “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations” between the U.S. and Taiwan, 
understanding that normalization in Sino-American relations would “contribute to the cause of 
peace in Asia and the world.”28 With diplomatic dialogue and trade to proceed, a repeat of 
Korean War style conflict became nearly impossible, and even if China was not becoming a 
democracy, liberal school academics could at least point to improvements in China’s shift from 
domestic demands of totalitarian party purism under Mao.   
 The political improvements, however significant, were dwarfed by economic 
liberalization reforms that, to this day, have delivered astounding results in national 
development. The economic half of the liberalist premise explains much more about Chinese 
foreign policy behavior than the democratic half and even offers cues on how China’s integration 
ought to proceed going forward. History already displays China as a center of regional 
commerce, envied by its neighbors and European merchants thousands of miles away. In fact, 
until the Industrial Revolution, China was the world’s largest and most productive economy. 
With the largest trading area and complete self-sufficiency, China had a greater share of world 
                                                     
27 The Shanghai Communique 
28 Ibid. 
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GDP than any Western country for eighteen of the last twenty centuries.29 Kissinger adds that “as 
late as 1820, it produced over 30 percent of world GDP – an amount exceeding the GDP of 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States combined.”30  
 China fell from economic grace throughout the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries as 
European powers extracted large trade and territorial concessions from China and later as Mao 
Zedong’s socialist policies tanked national productivity (and send tens of millions into poverty 
and death). Liberalists would not have much cause to celebrate if the Great Leap Forward and 
Cultural Revolution were still formal policy. However, as referenced earlier, Deng Xiaoping’s 
rise to power altered China’s trajectory for the better. Since the late 1970s, Deng restored market 
incentives to the economy, restored land ownership rights to farmers, opened the country to 
foreign trade and investment, and established a merit-based system of bureaucratic promotion to 
replace the ideological loyalty system of patronage.31 The results have been unprecedented, with 
300 million people lifted above the international poverty standard, 10 percent per year real 
economic growth, a GDP that has doubled every seven years since 1979, an increase of per 
capita income from $220 in 1978 to $4,940 in 2011, and attaining second largest economy status 
behind the United States.32 As liberalists would predict, the increase in Chinese market 
participation led to a greater participation in international institutional mechanisms and a lesser 
dependence on aggression as a means of statecraft. In fact, contrary to realists’ focus on self-
interest and power balance, liberalists would argue that China is looking for a stable international 
system as part of its foreign policy goals. China does not seek to eliminate or undermine 
international institutions or rules because it has no viable alternative to offer and is therefore a 
                                                     
29 Kissinger, On China, 11-12. 
30 Ibid., 12. 
31 Christensen, The China Challenge, 14. 
32 Ibid. 
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member of every major international institution (G7, G20, U.N. Peacekeeping, etc.). However, 
China does seek to “democratize” these international structures to serve the needs of those 
outside the west who would wish for their own chance at an economic miracle, mainly by getting 
non-G7 industrialized democracies involved in leading such structures and global endeavors.33 
One could interpret China’s construction of parallel institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) as complementary to the existing western-led framework of global 
institutions. Though China may seek to resist Western dominance of international finance and 
commerce, its creation of non-replacement, coexisting programs shows that it is not in the 
business of overturning the existing global economic system.34 China also has much to gain from 
the existing international order, and open markets are responsible for the decline in militant 
ideological fervor in China in the decades since Mao’s passing. China’s abidance by the 
international set-up of rules has enabled its extraordinary rise to economic success and global 
respect, facilitated by its economic interdependence with the U.S. and the United States’ 
provision of once inaccessible, but now public, goods to the Chinese economy.35 Trade and 
diplomacy of these kinds, a liberalist would argue, has and will continue to make a peaceful 
partner out of China. Nevertheless, military power remains the primary obsession of analysts, 
power being, according to realist political theory, the final and ultimate decider of who dictates 
the circumstances in any given corner of the world. 
 Concerning the rise of China over the last century, there are political optimists and 
pessimists who, as with realists and liberalists, see two different Chinas going forward, each with 
                                                     
33 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China and the World: Dealing With Reluctant Power,” Foreign Affairs 96.1 (2017): n.p.  
34 Zhang Xiaotong and James Keith, “From Wealth to Power: China's New Economic Statecraft,” The Washington 
Quarterly 40.1 (2017): 186. 
35 Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of an International Order in an Era of U.S. 
Decline,” International Security, 36.1 (2011): 63. 
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an opposite trajectory. Christopher Layne considers the optimistic and pessimistic views as two 
extreme and opposite analytical traps. If analyzed together though, one can identify a version of 
China that fits both molds. Optimists and pessimists only take account of raw material power, 
and nothing else that might bear importance such as history, culture, and domestic politics. 
According to Layne, pessimists consider China’s rise to regional hegemony as a destabilizing 
factor in East Asia and are often fearful of China’s national power with the understanding that 
U.S. leadership in Asia is not adequately sustainable.36 Optimists, on the other hand, claim that 
China will not catch up to U.S. military capabilities in the near future, with all measures of 
military power and economic indicators demonstrating that the U.S. has insurmountable 
superiority (for now at least) over China such that the U.S. need not concern itself over 
incremental Chinese improvements.37 As a matter of practical public policy, accounting for the 
relative loss of American advantage over China should be balanced with a calm and collected 
attitude towards the long-term vision of geopolitical strategy revisal. One must understand that 
plenty of time remains before the balance of power notably shifts, while not mistaking that 
situation for eternal advantage or even short-term invincibility. 
 Acknowledging the pessimist analysis of East Asia, there are indeed several reasons to be 
concerned with China’s rise. First, whether or not China chooses to extol its own bargaining 
position in this world or not, it knows as well as everyone else in the international community 
that it has substantial weight to influence events as it likes, whenever it likes (barring U.S. 
intervention for the short term). China has the world’s largest population (and therefore the 
capacity to summon the world’s largest armed force) and the world’s second largest economy 
behind the U.S. It is also one of nine nuclear powers and is physically equivalent in size to the 
                                                     
36 Christensen, The China Challenge, 2. 
37 Ibid. 
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U.S. with borders on Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Russia, and East Asia. China 
may be building bases on artificial islands in its adjacent seas, but its military resources are all on 
its territory and immediate periphery. The U.S., by contrast, has military personnel and 
equipment strewn throughout all six permanently inhabited continents. This means that under the 
weight of the unipolar world order, with multiple world security distractions on any given day, 
the U.S. will be underprepared and understaffed to meet a Chinese threat. In addition, several 
indicators would indicate that American geopolitical influence and power advantages have 
declined, and will continue to fall until China surpasses the U.S. as it seems poised to do. For 
example, at the end of World War II, the U.S. not only accounted for half the world’s GDP, but 
was also the primary creditor nation, enjoyed a positive trade balance, and had sole possession of 
atomic weapons. The U.S. also designed international institutions (IMF, U.N., GATT) and held a 
goodwill spanning the entirety of western and developing countries from its Marshall Plan.38 
Today, none of these advantage situations still hold true, with the exception of the international 
system the U.S. founded which still has seen a rise in non-U.S. leadership and influence. China is 
expected to surpass U.S. economic output by 2025, and regional economic powers have emerged 
across the continents like Brazil, India, and Turkey, all of whom have either rejected cooperation 
on security matters (like Turkey) or are decreasingly deferential to American leadership (Brazil 
and India), which is why the G8 expanded into the G20.39 The United States’ influence and 
status in the community of nations is declining. The Iraq and Afghan wars, by all measures and 
benchmarks for success, have failed. Dictators like Bashar Al-Assad have not stepped down to 
U.S. pressure. Iran is pursuing nuclear enrichment despite western sanctions. Worst of all, the 
                                                     
38 Stephen M. Walt, “The End of the American Era,” The National Interest 116 (2011): 7-8. 
39 Ibid., 9-10. 
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U.S. is heading towards bankruptcy and is acting as if a shortage of future resources is of no 
object. The Congressional Budget Office released projections stating that, on the present course, 
federal debt will exceed 100 percent of GDP by 2023, and 190 percent of GDP by 2035.40 In the 
near future, policymakers may realize that they cannot project authority from bankruptcy court, 
and the increasing debt-interest payments could force a harsh choice of budget prioritization 
between mandatory entitlement spending and discretionary military spending. For these reasons, 
the pessimist case has a point. The only question is when exactly the clock will ring on American 
dominance of East Asia. 
 An optimist’s analysis of East Asia will provide comforting indicators that should allow 
military analysts and policymakers in D.C. to make well-calculated, long-term considerations 
with peace of mind. As it stands right now, the U.S. armed forces are strategically located in 
such a way that forms a pincer between China’s East and West. East of China lies the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM), equipped with 325,000 military personnel, 180 ships and 1,900 
aircraft; to China’s west is U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), equipped with tens of 
thousands of troops and several airbases between Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. All around China 
are states participating in bilateral defense treaties with the U.S.–Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
South Korea, and the Philippines.41 This completes a strategic circle around most of China, and 
therefore there is not a need to expand on a system that is currently working as is. The deterrent 
effect so far has shown that as a result of encirclement, China is not yet in a position to challenge 
U.S. strength.  
                                                     
40 Ibid., 12. 
41 Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs 
91.5 (2012): n.p. 
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 In addition, for all the commentary suggesting American dependency on China, it may be 
more appropriate to suggest that the opposite is indeed the case, and that China will still need the 
U.S. for some time to come. To China, the U.S. is its single most important market and its largest 
source of foreign direct investment and advanced technology.42 The U.S. Navy can also blockade 
China’s sea lanes, thereby blocking critical shipments of oil and metal ore supplies, and the U.S. 
Treasury can impose sanctions backed by Federal Reserve on Chinese financial interests, the 
latter controlling the interest rates of the world’s reserve currency — the U.S. dollar.43 Lastly, 
despite the United States’ One-China policy, there are indeed actually “Two Chinas” in practice: 
Mainland China and Taiwan. The country is technically still divided, and that provides the U.S. a 
bargaining chip to keep China’s long-term grand ambitions on a leash. In the U.S.-China 
Communiqué of 1982, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to acknowledging “One China”, and 
also stated its intention not to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, with a 
gradual reduction in sales and transfers until the final resolution of the Taiwan issue.44 Ironically, 
the arms sales benchmark for gradual reductions was set at 1979 levels with inflation 
adjustments such that arms sales were actually increasing, and the U.S. redefined its arms sales 
as “technology transfers” to skirt agreement requirements.45 This rendered the 1982 communiqué 
a dead letter, and since then, Taiwan has liberalized towards democracy, making future 
unification with China a more complicated affair.  
 Still, the U.S. retains defense privileges if China forces itself into Taiwan, in which case 
the U.S. can resume full and explicit military cooperation with Taiwan. China, of course, is 
aware of this disadvantage, and of all the disadvantages holding China back. The seemingly 
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hopeless split from a significant piece of land it considers its own is the greatest humiliation to 
its own notion of internal sovereignty. If China chooses to challenge the United States, it will be 
over what it considers its own undisputed territory, and thus far China is unwilling to challenge 
the U.S. for restoration of the “twenty-third province.” The U.S., as demonstrated, has a flexible 
range of punitive measures to restrain China from military to economic, and the economic 
incentive on its own is compelling enough to cause China to second guess its own actions. The 
optimistic case, therefore, is proven and reassuring of the U.S. security situation. 
 In consideration of this comprehensive analysis of realist and liberal interpretations of 
China’s history, military modernization, and economic growth, the best course for engaging 
China as the U.S. is to proceed with a realist-optimist state of mind. Policy optimism is the level-
headed and collected approach to China, whereas pessimism sets a stage for cynicism in which 
everything would needlessly be put through a hostile lens, precluding opportunities for 
meaningful China-U.S. cooperation. Realism should ideologically guide American analyst 
interpretations of Chinese activity, understanding that each state ultimately prioritizes its own 
position first, and places economic unity and diplomatic cooperation second (or as it sees fit).  
 To this end, American foreign policy should recalibrate away from immediate military 
focus and readiness, to avoid unnecessary short-term conflicts in territories and waters not of 
strategic interest to the U.S. Instead of paying the costs of maintaining direct military presence in 
East Asia, the U.S. should allow China’s neighbors to band together to collectively defend their 
interests while domestic political deficiencies can be fixed. This means adopting a strategy of 
offshore balancing, not because America is too weak to project power, but because it has plenty 
of time to rebuild its military and diplomatic strength and China is not going to change its 
behavior overnight. As antiquated as it sounds, America can and should pursue an offshore 
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balancing strategy because of its separation by two oceans, its weak and friendly neighbors, its 
abundance of land and resources, and a large and productive population.46 As Stephen Walt and 
John Mearsheimer describe it, offshore balancing is a realist grand strategy, and would be 
responsible and tempered in allowing regional forces to keep each other in check, although the 
United States would come onshore to stabilize situations as a measure of last resort, to leave as 
soon as the situation is resolved.47 In addition to that, offshore balancing costs considerably less 
money than any strategy besides isolationism, particularly since it requires that America 
concentrate forces into only the strategic area in threat, much to the chagrin of the Chinese who 
stand to benefit from thin U.S. forces dispersal.48  
 To successfully rely on an offshore balancing strategy, America needs its allies around 
China to serve as the first line of defense. The Chinese strategy of encirclement a la Weiqi would 
be the staple of America’s approach to deterring Chinese assertiveness. The U.S. currently 
enjoys military arrangements with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, however 
encirclement will not be complete until India, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics (most 
importantly Kazakhstan) join in subtle collaboration to check Chinese ambitions in unison. 
Without making it exclusively militaristic in focus, which would be pure containment, this 
collaborative effort should focus more on cumulative balancing through other forms of 
cooperation. The approach offered by Ashley Tellis in her writings would prove useful in this 
endeavor. In it, she suggests that the U.S. ought to assist these regional powers with reaching 
their strategic interests as a means by which to build trust, interdependence, cooperation, and a 
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series of deepened partnerships.49 If U.S. aid or assistance can strengthen regional partners, 
particularly economically, then these states’ bargaining positions strengthen in such a way that 
economic interdependence between them and China would increase, thereby reducing China’s 
capacity for malevolence.50 This would require U.S. reentry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
and the fostering of Free Trade Agreements, regional and bilateral, between the U.S. and the 
encircling states, the U.S. and China, and also between China and the encircling states. In effect 
a trade triangle would be needed to implement this strategy. As the next strategy point will cover, 
economic growth is everything to China, and to risk the encirclement of sanctions would hurt it 
more than territorial disputes are worth. Just as NATO exists in Europe to protect member state 
sovereignty against an aggressive Russia, this pan-Asian circle of states should coalesce to form 
an unspoken NATO equivalent to protect their own sovereignty against China. 
 From an economic perspective, it will be critical to stall Chinese ambitions with 
continued trade and foreign investment, since economic growth and improved standards of living 
are what China have valued most since the death of Mao Zedong. Economic growth in China has 
been shrinking since 2010, which is problematic since regime legitimacy rests on rising popular 
welfare, global stature, and social stability51. As economic growth diminishes, China’s party 
regime apparatus, and Xi Xinping especially, will need to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy 
to save face with its elites. However, as the optimist would say, there is time. Declining growth 
has encouraged China to improve its economic performance by market liberalization efforts: 
interest rate flexibility, forming a bank deposit insurance system, expanding the private sector, 
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more research & development spending, and services sector promotion.52 U.S. corporations and 
domestic/international financial institutions combined have influence over all these efforts with 
their knowledge and expertise in such endeavors. Improved economic conditions ensure a less 
belligerent attitude in China, and a China not focused on territorial aggression is a China that will 
not need an American balancer.  
 As history proceeds into the twenty-first century, ongoing economic, political, and 
military patterns will continue to shape the global security situation in East Asia in ways for 
which no state can perfectly prepare for. When the twentieth century began, few foresaw the rise 
of Communism and the consequent birth of the USSR or Maoist China. Few foresaw two world 
wars from which the U.S. would emerge as the world’s military hegemon and leader of the 
international arrangement of world-integrating institutions. China is no exception to surprising 
developments. Should China’s foreign policy change, for better or worse, the U.S. must be ready 
to act upon each development. As the world awaits rise of this competitor power, China will 
undoubtedly reassert its national pride and resurrect its historical standing. As China’s economy 
becomes more central to international trade and China increases its sway over international 
institutions, the Middle Kingdom might come back sooner than the ordinary analyst might guess. 
China will continue to assert itself in the South and East China Seas and will likely back its 
territorial ambitions with military force against its neighbors, so the question remains when it 
will do so. The United States must not shirk its moral authority and responsibility to ensure that 
all states abide by international laws and norms. The U.S. has time to solidify its relationships 
and to employ new military technologies, but must not refrain from exercising its East Asian 
                                                     
52 Ibid., 113. 
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presence too long lest China destabilize a strategic location of the world, and a new Cold War 
ensues with a new bipolar order.  
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